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D
espite its importance and economic impact, 
in many ways U.S. environmental law is a 
conflicted mess. Congress’s inability to take 
major legislative action has led to a statu-
tory paralysis in environmental law that 
has lasted for 25 years, and the growing expansion of 
executive regulations to fill the gap has forced federal 
and state courts to interpret statutory authority in situ-
ations that Congress could never have foreseen. When 
overlaid with cooperative federalism structures to en-
courage experimentation at the state level, the noto-
rious complexity of current regulatory requirements, 
and the establishment of environmental programs in 
multiple, overlapping laws in distinct subject areas 
rather than one unifying statute, U.S. environmental 
law seems designed to generate confusion and overlap-
ping obligations and liabilities.
Yet the preeminent entity in the United States for the 
formulation and clarification of law — the American 
Law Institute — has so far declined to speak. While the 
ALI’s “restatements” and “projects” have helped crystal-
lize core U.S. legal doctrines, molded emerging fields 
of law, and explored complex international and admin-
istrative topics, the organization has not undertaken 
any major programs dedicated to environmental, natu-
ral resource, or energy law (even as some restatements 
and projects on other topics have included collateral 
environmental provisions). The ALI’s restraint may 
arise from several historical and policy factors, but they 
should not dissuade it from clarifying environmental 
and natural resource laws in the future.
What is a restatement of law? And what are ALI 
projects? Restatements are distillations of a particular 
field’s case law, statutes, and regulations into a coherent 
set of principles and rules. While they are not binding 
authority, restatements carry strong persuasive effect 
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because the ALI’s painstaking and collaborative process 
creates a reliable consensus of the U.S. legal communi-
ty on what the law is, or should be, in a particular area.
After preparing its initial restatements in 1944 and 
1952, the ALI began drafting its set of third restate-
ments in 1987 and started work on its fourth restate-
ment (on the foreign relations law of the United States) 
in 2013. Its latest restatements have expanded beyond 
traditional common law practice areas to include a 
broad array of topics: American Indian law, election 
law, employment law, non-profit governance, infor-
mation privacy principles, and unfair competition law. 
The ALI has expanded its practices into a second 
type of legal tool called “projects” to help clarify new 
areas of law. Specifically, the ALI has prepared “state-
ments of principles” in legal areas that might need 
reform or modification. 
These principles projects 
typically result from intense 
legal analysis and debate, 
and convey in-depth recom-
mendations for changes in 
that field. Such projects have 
dealt with relatively non-tra-
ditional legal fields outside 
core common law practice 
areas such as aggregate liti-
gation, family dissolution, 
transnational insolvency, 
and software contracts. In 
addition to principles proj-
ects, ALI engages in lesser projects to address narrower 
aspects of law that need clarification.
W
 e believe U.S. environmental law 
needs either a restatement or a prin-
ciples project that would offer a com-
prehensive analysis, and we briefly 
outline some possible reasons why the 
ALI has not yet undertaken such an endeavor. An on-
going informal effort by a workgroup of ALI members 
to define a potential environmental project has now 
begun and might offer the best opportunity for clari-
fication or reform. This workgroup of nearly fifty ALI 
members includes leading practitioners and academics, 
and it has proposed two carefully defined and limited 
projects in the environmental area. 
But even if the ALI initially undertakes one of these 
more focused efforts, it should still look to develop a 
broader principles of environmental law project or a 
full restatement in the near future. While some may 
fear that any comprehensive encapsulation might 
freeze environmental and natural resource law at a 
point where it still needs fundamental reform, the need 
for clarity and opportunities for measured improve-
ment outweigh those risks. 
Before embarking on a restatement or project on en-
vironmental law, the drafters will need to make thresh-
old choices on key tools and concepts. They will then 
face the important hurdle of defining which statutes, 
regulations, and common law principles constitute en-
vironmental law. This definitional prerequisite could 
pose difficult practical and doctrinal challenges. Many 
fields of law overlap with environmental interests, 
which constituted broadly includes natural resource 
and energy law, and as a result any credible assessment 
of environmental law principles and doctrine will need 
to include some examina-
tion of important related 
concepts in tort law, proper-
ty law, foreign relations law, 
conflicts of law, remedies, 
and other fields. The ALI, of 
course, has already spoken in 
all of these areas. 
While the ALI has not 
promulgated explicit official 
criteria for the selection of re-
statements or projects, some 
aspects of U.S. environmen-
tal law will likely trigger ob-
jections from ALI members 
who believe that the subject is not a good fit with the 
its practices and capabilities. These objections likely 
include that U.S. environmental law is largely statu-
tory and regulatory in nature, and consequently would 
benefit more from model legislation or other legisla-
tive avenues rather than a restatement. U.S. environ-
mental laws and regulations are also highly specialized 
and complex, and the ALI purportedly does not have 
environmental experts who can contribute to a restate-
ment. U.S. environmental laws — particularly climate 
change regulations and endangered species protections 
— involve highly politicized and controversial topics 
that can polarize practitioners and therefore lack the 
consensus needed to support a restatement or prin-
ciples project.
We believe, however, that the ALI can surmount 
these challenges. While U.S. environmental law un-
doubtedly has strong ties to federal statutes and rules, 
it also has deep historical roots in common law tort 
that shape core aspects of its legislative and regulatory 
framework. For example, environmental law includes 
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well-developed notions of nuisance, trespass, and neg-
ligence that operate in concert with statutory and rule-
making claims to provide broader avenues of redress 
for environmental injury. 
The ALI has tackled other areas of law that spring 
from heavily statutory sources, and its work has yielded 
important restatements and elaborations of principles. 
And even common law fields of practice that the ALI 
has explored in the past are now dominated or heav-
ily shaped by statutes and regulations. The presence of 
a legislative voice — especially if it is inconsistent in 
different areas and varies substantially 
over time — may actually increase the 
need for an authoritative distillation 
of the appropriate fundamental con-
cepts that should drive future legisla-
tive and legal development.
While U.S. environmental law has 
admittedly earned a well-deserved 
reputation for complexity, it also relies 
on areas of litigation and common law 
principles that should ring familiar to 
all lawyers whatever their area of prac-
tice. As the self-identification of nearly 
fifty ALI members for the workgroup 
attests, the ALI already has the level of 
expertise needed to navigate the com-
plexities of environmental law. And 
the controversies surrounding U.S. environmental law 
do not exceed the storms and disagreements over other 
legal fields that have received restatements or principles 
projects, including labor law, family law, and interna-
tional intellectual property. 
If a full restatement of environmental law poses con-
ceptual and logistical challenges, the ALI has a broad 
and sophisticated palette of alternative tools to help 
crystallize core U.S. environmental legal concepts. The 
ALI typically pursues principles projects when it also 
seeks to produce recommendations for changes to the 
law in the field. Because of the wider latitude offered 
by this approach, the ALI has prepared (or is currently 
working on) statements of principles in emerging or 
controversial fields of law including election law, ag-
gregate litigation, nonprofit organizations, and trans-
national insolvency.
Statements of principles present a promising mid-
dle path by offering a normative or aspirational vision 
of a legal subject rather than an authoritative restate-
ment of its full body. Rather than attempting to cap-
ture the complex and shifting universe of federal and 
state environmental laws and regulations, a statement 
of principles would allow the ALI to focus on distill-
ing that complexity into coherent sets of guidelines for 
interpretation and implementation of specific environ-
mental legal requirements. A statement of principles 
might also allow the ALI to avoid ensconcing outdated 
or harmful environmental legal concepts into a full re-
statement by instead pointing out normative goals that 
environmental law should seek. 
Against this backdrop, the ALI member workgroup 
concluded that beginning with a full restatement would 
pose significant difficulties and resource demands. Ac-
cordingly, the body suggested that an initial effort by 
the ALI in environmental law should 
focus on a manageable subtopic. 
The workgroup identified over 30 
different potential projects, discussed 
and ranked each suggestion, and 
evaluated the entire array of concepts 
under consistent criteria. Following 
this process and several additional 
discussions, the group identified two 
areas within environmental law as 
best suited for a project: the law of 
environmental assessment (which 
would include environmental impact 
statements and might encompass in-
ternational elements), or a project 
on the principles of environmental 
enforcement and remedies. The ALI 
recently declined the workgroup’s proposals for imme-
diate work, but it has not ruled out a future effort on 
environmental law. 
W
 hile the discussion within the ALI of 
a restatement of environmental law 
arose only recently, some scholars have 
already raised objections to the enter-
prise. Their concerns, as outlined by 
Professor Dan Tarlock in a recent article in the Brook-
lyn Law Review — see Sidebar — fall into four general 
categories. 
The ALI hasn’t done it that way historically. The first 
critique points to the ALI’s preference for subject areas 
with a strong body of judge-made law. At heart, this 
objection highlights the ALI’s original choices for re-
statements, which consisted of core common law sub-
jects with roots in Roman law. While the ALI has since 
evolved to include complex and novel subjects that fall 
outside this traditional agenda, the disjuncture with 
the ALI’s practice and current preferences offers some 
difficult but surmountable difficulties. 
Continued on page 42
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S i d e b a r
No Restatement, Please!
T he American Law Institute should not prepare a Restate-ment (First) of Environmental 
Law. We must look forward rather 
than backward. Humans have tradi-
tionally viewed the Earth as a trea-
sure chest to be exploited to sustain 
welfare irrespective of the social 
costs and limits of the natural re-
source base. 
The conclusion that we students 
of environmental protection have 
drawn from history is that to reverse 
this story of exploitation, we must 
develop a new relationship between 
humans and our rapidly degrading 
natural capital. The law needs to be 
rethought, re-imagined, and adapt-
ed to the preservation and enhance-
ment of our stressed planetary life 
support systems.
I thus offer four reasons why the 
restatement process is not a good 
vehicle to pursue this maddeningly 
frustrating objective. 
First, a restatement of envi-
ronmental law is too far from the 
ALI’s core mission of summarizing, 
cleaning up, and modestly reform-
ing the common or quasi-common 
law. It is true that the ALI has often 
strayed from its mission, but the 
nub of the problem for an environ-
mental restatement remains that 
the area is neither a common law 
subject nor does it have a set of 
substantive principles. Thus, there 
is very little to restate. There is no 
common law or any constitutional 
or quasi-constitutional environmen-
tal law jurisprudence. At its root, 
U.S. environmental law is primarily 
procedural.
Further, the many federal appel-
late and Supreme Court cases con-
struing the various statutes have 
failed to produce a set of coherent 
environmental law principles that 
could be summarized. A restate-
ment would add little to the exist-
ing law and might stifle necessary 
reform. 
Dan Tarlock
Second, a restatement is not pos-
sible because the science of environ-
mental protection, which drives the 
law, is dynamic. Our view of nature 
is radically changing. For example, 
originally, it was assumed that na-
ture was perfect and that as much 
of it as possible should be fenced 
off from human intervention. This 
view has been eroded by the emer-
gence of more sophisticated theo-
ries of ecosystem behavior, which 
recognize their dynamic nature. 
The original concept of resilience 
as a near-equilibrium steady state 
has been replaced, and ecologists 
try to measure resilience, according 
to H. Gunderson and C. S. Holling, 
“By the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be 
absorbed before the sys-
tem changes its structure 
by changing the variables 
and processes that con-
trol behavior.” 
We also know more 
about the causes of can-
cer. The “one hit” expo-
sure theory on which much of the 
regulation of pesticides, hazardous 
pollutants, and toxic substances 
was based no longer holds. Envi-
ronmental law was once dynamic, 
responding to new scientific knowl-
edge. Sadly, environmental law 
is now stagnant. We are trying to 
adapt decades-old statutes to prob-
lems which were not foreseen when 
they were enacted. 
Third, in light of what we have 
learned since the 1960s, we would 
draft very different statutes today 
than we did forty years ago, just as 
almost all of us are not trying to buy 
the type of shiny gas guzzling cars 
Detroit was then churning out. A 
new National Environmental Policy 
Act would recognize this means 
that all attempts to manage nature 
are experiments; each experiment 
will have different targets and pro-
tocols; and that all resources have 
to be managed adaptively. 
In short, a restatement of en-
vironmental law would by neces-
sity enshrine the existing regulatory 
structure and fragmented judicial 
glosses on it, thus fossilizing the 
whole setup. 
A restatement would also en-
shrine the Supreme Court’s envi-
ronmental jurisprudence, such as 
it is, most of which should be re-
pudiated rather than restated. The 
law of standing is a case in point. 
At the beginning of the environmen-
tal movement academics such as 
Louis Jaffe of Harvard presented a 
liberal theory of standing fully com-
patible with Article III of the Consti-
tution. But the Supreme 
Court has created a 
crabbed and confusing, 
indeed baroque, stand-
ing jurisprudence. 
Fourth, now is not the 
right time to restate envi-
ronmental law. The trea-
sure-chest view, which 
is once again in the as-
cendency, must be replaced with 
a science-based stewardship. Envi-
ronmental law had a charmed birth 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. A na-
tional consensus developed that we 
had to address a number of threats 
to the environment, and Congress 
responded swiftly. Because the is-
sues were seen as technical and 
scientific, the myth arose that en-
vironmentalism was a nonpartisan 
issue and would remain so. 
Today, the very idea of effective 
environmental protection is contest-
ed, and a restatement project would 
plunge the drafters into the situations 
that the ALI tries to avoid: a deep, 
partisan political divide and thus no 
consensus on basic principles.
 
Dan Tarlock is Distinguished Professor 
of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The 
author is a lax but lifetime member of the 
American Law Institute.
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Environmental law pursues goals at odds with core 
common law precepts. According to this critique, the 
positivist nature of environmental law requires it to use 
a forward-looking perspective to avoid damage. This 
central quality of environmental law allegedly poses a 
fundamental problem for the entire enterprise of re-
stating it: the principles of environmental law are, ac-
cording to Tarlock, “Profoundly antithetical to both 
the function of the common law and to the restate-
ment tradition.” 
In essence, this position contends that environmen-
tal statutes respond to the shortfalls of prior common 
law doctrines and allocations of property entitlements 
that allowed the use of air, water, and soil as dump-
ing grounds. In addition, environmental law seeks to 
both protect functioning ecosystems and wildlife that 
common law historically has tended to destroy as well 
as to protect them against a constellation of future or 
emerging risks. Common law doctrines and concepts 
of due process, by contrast, require proof of “but for” 
causation and linkages between spe-
cific conduct by defendants and iden-
tifiable consequences to plaintiffs, and 
as a result the courts have struggled 
with crafting effective legal responses 
to risks of future harm that have not 
yet materialized.
The courts have not created a true 
quasi-constitutional environmental 
body of law that would support a re-
statement. Moving to environmental 
case law, the third argument attacks 
the feasibility of distilling U.S. envi-
ronmental decisions into a restate-
ment on the ground that those rulings 
lack a developed core of foundational 
principles that a restatement could 
readily capture. As an outgrowth of positive law cre-
ated predominantly by federal statutes, environmental 
judicial law purportedly has failed to coalesce around 
the type of judge-made principles that underlie other 
areas where the ALI has focused its efforts. In contrast 
to the forward-looking, positivist nature of environ-
mental statutory law, environmental common law 
based in tort seeks to administer corrective justice by 
compensating victims for their injuries — and restat-
ing the principles from those cases would necessarily 
require a backward-looking perspective incompatible 
with principles from the statutes. 
There is no substantive environmental law at all. This 
final line of objection climaxes with a startling claim: 
because current environmental laws result from the 
messy intersection of rational responses to novel and 
emerging problems with the raw jostling of interest-
based politics, any attempt to identify common fun-
damental legal principles from them strains to discern 
a coherent set of axioms that simply don’t exist. At 
heart, this view of environmental law concludes that 
there isn’t a “there” there to restate. This position has 
been advanced by Tarlock in an article in the Land Use 
and Environmental Law Review. Because environmen-
tal statutes offer a positivist response to fast-moving 
problems and developing science through the lens of 
current political expediencies and dysfunctions, they 
essentially must resort to procedural solutions that 
assure fairness without providing a substantive core. 
These types of procedural fields of law, according to 
the critique, necessarily offer poor grist for the restate-
ment process.
These criticisms understate work by other schol-
ars that points to the link between environmental 
statutes and prior common law principles. But 
more fundamentally, this argument 
goes to the heart of the debate over 
whether the ALI should pursue a 
restatement or project. While mod-
ern U.S. environmental law springs 
from statutory sources and suffers 
from conflicting goals and process-
es, it undeniably exists. A vast array 
of treatises, textbooks, articles, and 
scholarly advice has already created 
a deep body of work on the heart 
of environmental law precepts, and 
the fact of those writings strongly 
implies that critical facets of envi-
ronmental law can be captured in a 
systematic form through a restate-
ment or principles project. These 
materials should also considerably smooth the tran-
sition of those core principles into work by the ALI. 
To the extent that environmental law also in-
cludes procedural elements as a surrogate for sub-
stantive goals that elude political consensus, a re-
statement or principles project could note that 
interaction and — more importantly — identify 
the limits where even a properly followed proce-
dural path typically will not intrude on a substan-
tive goal. For example, the National Environmental 
Policy Act imposes a procedural requirement that 
federal agencies rigorously assess the potential en-
vironmental impacts of their major actions with-
out setting substantive limits on actions after that 
review. This simple formulation, however, fails to 
The criticisms 
of the possibility 
of a restatement 
understate work 
that points to 
the link between 
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statutes and prior 
common law 
principles
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account for the critical role that this procedural 
process plays in invoking and buttressing substan-
tive limits on judicial decisions on arbitrary and 
capricious final agency action under other federal 
statutes (including environmental laws). Claiming 
that it is impossible to restate or capture the princi-
ples of environmental law — like many a historical 
pronouncement that a task simply cannot be done 
— only highlights the need to actually make the 
attempt.
T
 hese objections also minimize the ALI’s 
capacity and flexibility to tackle areas of 
law that lie outside traditional common 
law spheres. The ALI has 
already produced ground-
breaking work in disparate topics 
as far flung as software contracts, 
international commercial arbitra-
tion, and family dissolution. While 
the ALI’s early efforts undeniably 
focused on traditional common 
law fields, nothing about the ALI’s 
current deliberative approach and 
consensus-based process makes it 
unfit for other fields of law that 
arise from statutory roots. The core 
prerequisites — richness of case 
law, complexity of issues, and need 
for clarity — apply equally to code-
driven law that has spurred the de-
velopment of its own dense case law and regulatory 
framework. 
More importantly, the ALI can expressly mold its 
approach to reflect the novelty or lack of doctrinal de-
velopment within a legal subject. If the ALI believes 
that the area needs substantial reform or normative 
analysis, it can choose to adapt its work into a project 
or a principles statement rather than a full-bore re-
statement. In fact, several members of our workgroup 
expressed a preference to pursue a project for these 
very reasons — while acknowledging that the ALI’s 
projects have wielded less influence than its restate-
ments. By contrast, the ALI has already successfully 
wrestled with some of the concerns through restate-
ments during its Restatement (Third) of Torts on toxics 
litigation and its expanded concepts of causation in 
the use of probabilistic risk.
Assuming that the ALI could readily capture posi-
tivist and prospective environmental law principles in 
a restatement, critics question whether such an en-
deavor would do more damage than good. This posi-
tion builds on the larger belief that the ALI’s efforts can 
have the perverse effect of freezing developing fields 
of law in undesirable and stunted positions. Environ-
mental law, as a response to emerging science and of-
ten fast-moving threats, is still evolving and needs the 
flexibility to expand and adapt to looming dangers. 
By attempting to capture current U.S. environmental 
law principles in a restatement, the ALI may uninten-
tionally solidify current standards that are too meek or 
timorous to effectively address fundamental environ-
mental challenges such as climate change, biodiversity 
loss, or synthetic toxic chemicals.
This bleak view of current U.S. environmental law, 
however, generates its own riposte. It eschews a fun-
damental study of environmental law 
to identify its most important core 
principles and doctrines in the hope 
that future developments might lead 
to stronger standards. But that same 
argument posits a lack of a current 
political consensus and an ability of 
special interests to frustrate stronger 
environmental standards that will 
likely continue for the indefinite fu-
ture absent an effort to identify and 
address shortfalls in current law. By 
holding onto today’s dross in hopes 
of future gold, such a cautious strat-
egy might forego the opportunity to 
make significant progress now.
In addition, the ALI can forth-
rightly seek to point out future actions and doctrines 
to strengthen environmental law to respond to antici-
pated or emerging needs. Restatements have the abil-
ity to include normative directions for additional legal 
clarification and growth (including the healthy revision 
or withdrawal of obsolete or damaging outdated legal 
statements, such as its revisit to its prior statements on 
the death penalty and sentencing for sexual offenses). 
While the ALI typically subordinates its efforts at le-
gal reform when it undertakes a restatement in pursuit 
of accurately capturing the current state of law, it can 
nonetheless identify areas where existing legal practices 
are in conflict and identify the preferred choice among 
them. 
Environmental law needs a fresh perspective and 
an organizing eye. The ALI has filled this role in the 
past with other important legal areas. It can dispel the 
current doctrinal conflict and confusion in this field 
and provide a clear path ahead in an area of law that, 
by its very nature, touches us all. TEF
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